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LOVING v. UNITED STATES
116 S. Ct 1737 (1996)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
On December 12, 1988, two taxicab drivers from Kileen, Texas
were murdered by Dwight J. Loving, an Army private stationed at Fort
Hood, Texas. The first victim was a member of the Armed Forces on
active duty and the second was a retired serviceman who gave Loving a
ride from the barracks on the same night as the first killing. Loving
attempted to murder a third, but the driver disarmed him and escaped.
Civilian and Army officials arrested Loving the next afternoon, and
Loving confessed to the killings. 1
After a trial, an eight-member general court-martial found Loving
guilty of premeditated murder and felony murder underArticle 118 of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). 2 At his sentencing trial, the
court-martial found three aggravating factors: (1) that the premeditated
murder was committed during a robbery; 3 (2) that Loving acted as the
triggerman in the felony murder, 4 and (3) that Loving, having been found
guilty of the premeditated murder, had committed a second murder,
5
which was also proven at his single trial. These aggravating factors were
not prescribed by federal statute; rather, they were the product of an
Executive Order issued by President Ronald Reagan. The court-martial
sentenced Loving to death.
6
The commander who convened the court-martial approved the
findings and sentence. The United States Army Court of Military Review
and the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces affirmed,
rejecting Loving's claims that the Eighth Amendment and the separa-
tion-of-powers doctrine require that Congress, not the President, make
the fundamental policy determination respecting the factors that warrant
the death penalty.7 The Supreme Court of the United States granted
certiorari8 to resolve whether the President, in our system of separated
powers, may prescribe the aggravating factors thatpermit a court-martial
to impose the death penalty upon a member of the armed forces convicted
of murder.9
HOLDING
The Supreme Court held: (1) the principles of separation-of-powers
did not preclude Congress from delegating its constitutional authority to
1 Loving v. United States, 116 S. Ct 1737, 1740, 1751 (1996).
2 10 U.S.C. § 918(1), (4).
3 Rule for Courts-Martial (RCM) 1004(c)(7)(B).
4 RCM 1004(c)(8).
5 RCM 1004(c)(7)(J).
6 Loving, 116 S. Ct. at 1740.
7 In affirming, both courts relied upon United States v. Curtis, 32
M.J. 252 (CMA 1991).
8 Loving, 116 S. Ct. 39 (1995).
9 Id. at 1740.
10 Article 18 states that a court-martial "may, under such limitations
as the President may prescribe, adjudge any punishment not forbidden by
[the UCMJ], including the penalty of death when specifically authorized
by" the Code. 10 U.S.C. § 818.
Article 36 provides: "Pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures, in-
cluding modes of proof, for [courts martial] ... may be prescribed by the
President by regulations which shall, so far as he considers practicable,
define the aggravating factors that permit imposition of the death penalty
in military capital cases to the President; (2) such a delegation took place
through enactment of Articles 18, 36 and 56 of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ); 10 and (3) once delegated the power by Con-
gress, the President had the authority, as Commander in Chief, to
prescribe the aggravating factors without further guidance. 11
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I. Is Loving Truly a Separation of Powers Case?
In order to decide Loving, the Supreme Court framed the issue as
one simply of separation of powers; that is, it asked whether Congress
may delegate its power to the President to promulgate a rule that restricts
imposition of the death penalty to murders in which aggravating circum-
stances have been established and selects those aggravating factors.
Loving challenged the President's authority to promulgate such a rule,
arguing: (1) that Congress cannot constitutionally delegate such author-
ity to the President; (2) that if Congress can constitutionally delegate such
authority, it did not do so in this instance; and (3) that if Congress did
delegate in this situation, such a delegation was unconstitutional because
it lacked any "intelligible principle."
12
After an exhaustive historical review, going back to 13th century
England, which included, incidentally, many references to distaste for
the practice of military courts trying capital cases, the Court concluded
that Congress could delegate its power to prescribe punishment to the
President. 13 As to Loving's second argument, the Court construed the
language of Articles 18, 36, and 56 together, and concluded that Con-
gress did delegate.14 Loving aptly pointed out that these Articles were
enacted prior to Furman v. Georgia,15 which held for the first time that
the Constitution required capital sentencing to be guided. Consequently,
Loving argued that the Articles could not have been extended to address
this issue. The Court held, however, that Furman did not undo the
delegation. According to the Court, although what would have been an
act of grace in 1950 may now be a constitutional requirement, the
President has had the power to prescribe such aggravating factors since
1950.16
apply the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized
in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts, but which
may not be contrary to or inconsistent with this chapter." 10 U.S.C. §
836(a).
Article 56 specifies that "[tihe punishment which a court-martial
may direct foran offense may not exceed such limits as the President may
prescribe for that offense." 10 U.S.C. § 856.
11 Loving, 116 S. Ct. at 1748-51. With regard to the separation-of-
powers doctrine, Loving is quite an unremarkable decision, as it is has
been the Court's trend over the years not to find an unconstitutional
delegation of power. In fact, the Court has not disapproved of a
delegation since 1935. Id. at 1750.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 1744-49.
14 Id. at 1749-50.
15 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
16 Loving, 116 S. Ct. at 1750.
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Finally, as to Loving's third argument, the Court in effect held that
no intelligible principle was needed in this situation because the delega-
tion was linked with the President's authority and responsibility as
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. However, central to the
application of the Eighth Amendment 17 is an analysis of the "evolving
standards of decency" with regard to what constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment.18 Given that, the issue in Loving may be more properly
characterized as an Eighth Amendment question: who is eligible for
death and under what circumstances?
In recent years, the Supreme Court has said much about how we
should decide this question. In Gregg v. Georgia,19 the Court established
the basic proposition that "The Eighth Amendment serves to assure that
the State's power to punish is 'exercised within the limits of civilized
standards,' and central to the application of the Amendment is a determi-
nation of contemporary standards regarding the infliction of punish-
menL" 20 The Court expanded this principle in Woodson v. North
Carolina,21 finding that "the two crucial indicators of evolving standards
of decency respecting the imposition of punishment in our society [are]
jury determinations and legislative enactments."'22 Thus, the Supreme
Court has instructed that in order to learn what is tolerable under the
Eighth Amendment, one must look to what juries do and to what
legislatures have done. The Supreme Court has consistently applied this
framework of analysis to Eighth Amendment challenges to death penalty
schemes. 23
Thus, if the Court had framed the issue in Loving to be an Eighth
Amendment concern, it would have been much more difficult for the
Court to justify the proposition that the President has the authority to
determine the circumstances under which "evolving standards of de-
cency" permit the imposition of death sentences. The Court could not
have held that an intelligible principle was unnecessary based solely on
the President's status as Commander in Chief, as Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence requires that "legislative enactments" (and thus, an "intel-
ligible principle") be considered in determining the circumstances under
which "evolving standards of decency" permit death sentences.
I. An Invitation to Challenge the Jurisdiction of Courts-Martial
The question whether courts-martial have jurisdiction over off-
post, off-duty crimes committed by military members is an issue that has
been vigorously debated by the United States Supreme Court. While the
Court first held that courts-martial had jurisdiction only over crimes that
were "service-connected" 24 (that is, on-post, on-duty crimes), the Court
later overruled this determination in Solorio v. United States.25 In
17 Excessivebail shall notbe required, norexcessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." Amendment VIII,
Constitution of the United States (emphasis added).
18 The Court held in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) that the
Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment clause embodies a
flexible concept. What it forbids at any given time is to be determined
by "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society." Id. at 101.
19 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
20 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 176-82 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at
100).
21 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (holding that
evolving standards of decency-jury determinations and legislative
enactments-conclusively point to the repudiation of automatic death
sentences).
22 Id. at 293.
Solorio, the court held that jurisdiction of courts-martial depends solely
on the accused's status as a member of the Armed Forces, and not on the
"service connection" of the offense charged. 26 Thus, according to
Solorio, the court-martial has jurisdiction over any non-capital crime
committed by a military member, regardless of whether the crime
occurred on-post or off-post, on-duty or off-duty. However, Solorio was
not a capital murder case, and as Justice Stevens points out in his
concurrence in Loving, the Court has not yet decided whether the rule in
Solorio should in fact apply to capital cases. 27
Nonetheless, Justice Stevens acknowledged thatLoving was not an
appropriate case to challenge the applicability of Solorio to capital
offenses, and voted to uphold Loving's death sentence. This is undoubt-
edly becauseLoving's victims weremiitary members and the crime was
thus "service connected." The court-martial arguably exercised jurisdic-
tion over Loving both because he himself was an Army private and
because the offense had a "service connection." Stated another way, the
court-martial did not base its jurisdiction over Loving solely on the fact
that he was a member of the Armed Forces, and this precluded any
clarification of the applicability of Solorio.
However, this did not stop Justice Stevens from pointing out that the
issue has not yet been resolved. According to Justice Stevens, capital
cases may be different enough from non-capital cases such that the Court
should require that there must be a "service connection" for the court-
martial to retain jurisdiction over a military defendant charged with
capital murder. In effect, Justice Stevens left the door open for defense
counsel to challenge the jurisdiction of courts-martial over off-post, off-
duty, peacetime crimes committed by military members.
III. Applicability of Furman to Military Capital Murder
In analyzing Loving, the Court stated, "The Government does not
contest the application of our death penalty jurisprudence to courts-
martial.... and we shall assume that Furman [v. Georgia] and the case
law resulting from it are applicable to the crime and sentence in
question." 28 However, the Courtdid notexpresslyhold thatFurman and
later constitutional limitations control courts-martial. Thus, by its seem-
ingly open invitation to challenge courts-martial jurisdiction over off-
post, off-duty offenses against civilian victims, and its failure to resolve
the application of constitutional limitations on death sentences to the
military, the Court left two issues undecided: (1) the extent of military
jurisdiction over capital crimes; and (2) the applicability of Furman and
its progeny to military trials for capital murder.
23 See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (holding that Eighth
Amendment does not preclude execution of a mentally retarded defen-
dant in the face of insufficient evidence of national consensus against
executing mentally retarded people convicted of capital offenses);
Endmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (holding that current judg-
ments of legislatures,juries, and prosecutors weighed heavily on the side
of rejecting capital punishment for defendant who neither took life,
attempted to take life, nor intended to take life during the course of a
robbery).
24 O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258,272 (1969).
25 483 U.S. 435 (1987).
26 Id. at 450-5 1.
27 Loving, 116 S. Ct. at 1752.
28 Id. at 1742 (emphasis added).
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The resolution of such issues raises three possible outcomes. The
Court could decide thatFurman and its progeny do not apply, and that the
courts-martial havejurisdiction over off-post, off-duty murders commit-
ted by military members. The undesirable result of such a holding would
be the trial of some military members for capital murder without any of
the constitutional death penalty protections.
Secondly, the Court could decide that Furman and its progeny do
apply to military capital murder, but that courts-martial have jurisdiction
only over service-connected, off-post crimes. This would narrow the
scope of military jurisdiction, but equalize the constitutional protections
between military members and civilians. Finally, the Court could find
that Furman is applicable to military capital murder and that there is no
limitation on the jurisdiction of courts-martial.
IV. The Benefits of Military Jurisdiction
Despite what has been said about Furman and its possibilities,
defense counsel in Virginia should not automatically shy away from
military jurisdiction if there is an ambiguity as to which jurisdiction
should apply.29 There are many benefits to military jurisdiction. First,
military law provides a much more direct and generally broader scope of
discovery by an accused than is normally available to him in civilian
criminal prosecutions. For example, military law provides that witness
statements relating to a charged offense are provided to the accused prior
to trial; 30 in other federal courts, the Jencks Act 31 only requires such
statements to be provided after the witness has testified. According to
military law, the government is obliged to disclose to the defense, as soon
as practicable, any evidence known to the government which reasonably
tends to reduce punishment. 32 At the request of the defense, the
29 In addition to the jurisdictional questions raised by the military
status of the defendant and victim, the "off-post" question may not be
easy to resolve in some cases. There are a significant number of military
installations in Virginia, many of which include remote areas whose
boundaries are not always defined with precision.
30 R.C.M. 701(a)(1)(C). But see Va. Rule 3A:I l(b)(2) (no right to
witness statements).
31 18 U.S.C. § 3500.
32 R.C.M. 701(a)(6)(C).
33 "Inspect," as used in R.C.M. 701, includes the right to photo-
graph and copy. R.C.M. 701(h).34 R.C.M. 701(a)(6)(c).
35 10 U.S.C. § 832 (1988). Article 32 provides for a hearing at
which the accused is advised of the charges against him. At this hearing,
the accused has the full opportunity to cross-examine witnesses against
him if they are available and to present evidence on his own behalf either
in defense or mitigation. The investigating officer has the right to cross-
examine any of the accused's witnesses. If the charges are forwarded
after the Article 32 hearing, § 832(b) provides that they "shall be
accompanied by a statement of the substance of the testimony taken on
both sides and a copy thereof shall be given to the accused."
36 10 U.S.C. § 838(b)(3)(A) (1988).
37 Article 66 provides, in relevant part: "In a case referred to it, the
Court of Criminal Appeals may ... affirm only such findings of guilty,
government is obliged to permit the defense to inspect33 such written
material as will be presented at the presentencing proceedings as well as
to notify the defense of the names and addresses of the witnesses the
government intends to call at the presentencing proceedings. 34 Further-
more, all relevant evidence against the accused in the hands of the
government is made directly available to the accused in the Article 32
investigation.
35
Second, civilian defense counsel is entitled to the assistance of
detailed military counsel. 36 Apart from the general assistance that
additional counsel can provide, military counsel can aid civilian counsel
with the procedural rules of the military system. Third, all death sen-
tences are subject to reduction on appeal. Boards of Review have wide
powers over sentences.37 The Court of Military Appeals has ruled that
they are empowered to be compassionate, to reduce legal sentences, and
even to commute a death sentence.3 8 A board may even decide to affirm
no sentence at all. 39 Finally, death sentences are rarely imposed by
courts-martial.40
Thus, depending on the nature of the case, defense counsel might
consider whether the potential benefits of military jurisdiction would
outweigh the disadvantages even if the defendant may receive fewer
constitutional protections in military court in some respects. Particularly
if the Furman issue is resolved in favor of extension to courts-martial, as
the language of Loving indicates it probably will be, clients may some-
times be better served by urging military jurisdiction.
Summary and analysis by:
Lisa M. Jenio
and the sentence or such part or amount of the sentence, as it finds correct
in law and fact and determines, on the bases of the entire record, should
be approved." 10 U.S.C. § 866 (1988). See United States v. Cavallaro,
14 C.M.R. 71 (1954) (holding that although Article 66 does not authorize
a board of review to change the form of punishment imposed by a court-
martial, a board of review possesses the power to reduce a sentence to
make it appropriate).
38 See UnitedStates v.Russo (No. 13,565), 29 C.M.R. 168 (holding
that whether it be termed commutation, mitigation, or merely a reduction
in punishment, both the convening authority and a board of review have
the authority to lessen the severity of a death penalty by converting it to
a dishonorable discharge and confinement at hard labor).
39 See United States v. Jackson (No. 9159), 23 C.M.R. 301 (1957)
(holding review board had power to affirm no punishment as the
appropriate sentence based on its review of the record). See also Jackson
v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 569 (1957) (holding army review board had authority
to modify life sentence to 20 years after murder conviction was set aside
where soldier, who was found guilty of rape, which caried death
sentence or life imprisonment, and premeditated murder, which required
death sentence or life imprisonment, received gross sentence of life).
40 As of April 30,1996, there were only eight (8) death row inmates
with death sentences imposed by the U.S. Military. NAACP Legal
Defense Fund, Death Row, U.S.A. (1996).
